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ABSTRACT. Evolving as Foucault’s third modulation of power, security power marks a radical 
departure from previous eras of sovereign and disciplinary power. Dramatically decentering the 
individual, altering the means by which government acts and shifting from a static to a dynamic 
conception of temporal activity, an understanding of Foucauldian security power provides a num-
ber of critical insights into modern governance. This paper seeks to explain and analyze Foucault’s 
conceptualization of security power as the new language of governance and apply it in relation to 
the pervasive phenomena of government attempts to control fertility. Using the cases of inter-war 
France and post-colonial India, the theorization of security power will be grounded in the realities 
of natalist policy demonstrating the universality of the exercise of security power and its applica-
bility to numerous contexts and settings. The concretization of theory in case study not only illu-
minates the workings of a new model of power but highlights the difficulty of resisting this novel 
type of government control. Understanding power to understand modes of resistance is central to 
the Foucauldian method, and drawing from Foucault’s newly translated lectures, this paper will 
bring to light a fascinating mode of analysis which helps illuminate the evolving nature of power 
and control in the modern era. 
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The language of power has changed over the last thirty years as the work of Michel Fou-
cault has introduced a whole new vocabulary to the understanding of governance. Ex-
ploring the basic operating mechanisms of the structures of power which works on and 
through individuals, Foucault articulates three fundamental ways in which the state has 
sought to maintain control of, act upon and maximize its capabilities through those under 
its charge: sovereign, discipline and security power. While the history of sovereign power 
has been well established and a plethora of literature has emerged articulating the various 
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disciplinary mechanisms which have evolved over the recent past, the field of security 
power has been relatively understudied and is fruitful ground for exploration. This article 
seeks to explore the concept of security power as articulated by Foucault in his work Se-
curity, Territory, Population1 and its application to the study of population control in the 
cases of inter-war France and post-colonial India.  
Just as disciplinary power has wide ranging applications in society and has been stud-
ied in contexts ranging from the prison to education and health care, security power is a 
similarly widespread and pervasive social phenomenon. Theoretical exposition of this 
subject is critical, as is the concretization of theory in historical practice as the practices of 
security power have been routinely ignored in the literature. Thus, this article will exam-
ine the theory of security power in the first half of the article, as discussed by Foucault, 
which will be followed by case studies of inter-war France and modern India in relation 
to their respective attempts to control fertility and population growth. These cases are 
important not just for the concretization of theory in practice but also to understand the 
nature of population politics itself. State management of fertility has become a pervasive 
feature of the 20th and 21st centuries with over 85% of governments worldwide utilizing a 
security approach to controlling the reproductive powers of their citizens.2 Foucauldian 
security is the new unspoken language of state power and thus understanding security 
power is critical to understanding the modern application of state power as such. 
Moreover, this new form of power makes resistance to the state increasingly difficult. 
Foucauldian security does not merely shift the object of governance but alters the very 
modes of action, which makes targeted resistance an elusive goal. Thus a major goal of 
this work will not be to criticize or problematize security as such but rather to illuminate 
its operation and uncover ground where action may be taken to offer better resistance 
when necessary. Grounding itself in the realities of state control, this article seeks to lay 
the theoretical foundations for directed action and uncover the complexities which ex-
plain why resistance has so often failed. 
Efforts to control population growth have been a pervasive phenomenon of the 20th 
and 21st centuries with most governments of Europe, Asia and Africa subject to some form 
of attempted manipulation of the procreative powers of the population. While this phe-
nomenon has been subject to extensive study by historians, demographers, sociologists 
and anthropologists3, this powerful modern movement has been little studied from a the-
oretical position related to the exercise of security power.4 Little research has been done 
                                                        
1 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-78 [2004] (2009) 
2 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, World Population Policies 
2013 Report (2013). 
3 Matthew Connelly, “Seeing Beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sov-
ereignty” Past and Present 193 (2006): 197-233, Paul Demeny, “Population Policy: A Concise Summary” Pop-
ulation Council, Policy Research Division, Working Paper No. 173 (2003), Dennis Hodgson, “Demography: 
Twentieth Century History” International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences (2001), Simon Szre-
ter, “The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History” 
Population and Development Review 19 :4 (1993): 659-701. 
4 With the possible exception of Greenhalgh. Susan Greenhalgh, “The Chinese Biopolitical: Facing the 
Twenty-First Century” New Genetics and Society 28:3 (2009): 205-222. 
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which would explain why, as of 2013, 171 out of 194 states are actively trying to control 
the reproductive powers of their citizens.5 The cases of inter-war France and post-colonial 
India will be examined to help elucidate the modes of governance related to security 
power as these cases represent a divergent sampling of states which have been exemplars 
of security power in relation to their attempts to control the population. Their diverse 
settings, time and place serve as an excellent grounding point to demonstrate the univer-
sality of the exercise of security power and will be used primarily to demonstrate the 
mechanisms of security power in action to concretize the theoretical discussion of the first 
half of the article. Moreover, a comparison of the cases will help demonstrate not only the 
workings of security power but also provide a rationale for why policies may fail as well 
as why organized resistance is often frustrated.  
Thus, much will not be examined as each case has a unique history and it is not the 
purpose of this paper to explore in depth the ways in which fertility has been controlled 
in any particular case. Rather the cases are meant to illustrate particular commonalities in 
modes of governance across widely divergent spatial and temporal cases and to highlight 
the fundamental operations of security power’s modus operandi. Without an appreciation 
of security power, one is liable to underappreciate the essence of much state activity which 
pervades the international political landscape. 
Shifting the Object of Governance 
Security power is fundamentally different from Foucault’s more popularized concepts of 
sovereign and disciplinary power. While evolving last and representing the most recent 
incarnation of governmentality, it diverges from earlier forms of power in its very con-
ceptualization of the object of governance, the means to govern the object and the devices 
used to maximize its objective. Under sovereign and disciplinary forms of power, the in-
dividual is the object of governance. Power seeks to act on the bodies of the governed in 
an immediate and tangible manner as the workings of the state are inscribed on the phys-
icality of its subjects. The object of governance, the individual, is bent to the will of the 
state, often through sheer force. In the case of sovereign power, this may take the form of 
public torture or execution as obedience to the will of the regime is enforced through the 
ability of the state to kill or let live.6 After obedience to the sovereign is assured, sovereign 
power places relatively few demands on the everyday lives of its subjects.7 
Disciplinary power represents an evolution of power as while the object is still the in-
dividual, the scope of obedience and control demanded by the state is amplified exponen-
tially. The perfectibility of the object is, at heart, the guiding truth of disciplinary power. 
The state seeks to govern the totality of elements which shape the behaviour of the indi-
vidual as both the outer life of the individual, in terms of the regimentation and surveil-
lance of time and space, as well as the inner life of the object, in its concepts of truth, 
morality, duty and aspirations, fall under the legitimized realm of governance. The state 
                                                        
5 United Nations, World Population Policies 2013 
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1995), 8. 
7 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 34. 
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seeks to discipline the object such that the whole of its existence is captured and harnessed 
to serve ends that maximize its social utility and transform it into a docile and capable 
individual. Control over the individual allows the state to grow in strength and the power 
of the state can be assessed in terms of the sum of the successful disciplining of numerous 
individuals.8 
Security power marks a significant break as it reorients the object of governance away 
from the individual and towards the collective. The ‘population’ becomes the object of 
governance and individuals per se are merely a means to reach that end. The object is not 
a tangible reality and no physical body is being worked upon with direct intent but rather 
the physicality of reality is a tool to arrive at an intangible as security power “works at the 
level of the imaginary reality”.9 The concept of the population is more important than any 
real individual and furthermore an individual may be ultimately expendable to achieve 
an idealized abstraction.10 This is a critical evolutionary leap in the conceptualization of 
power and purpose as the state effectively detaches itself from the lives of any particular 
individuals or groups of people and works solely at the level of the concept of the people 
as told through an aggregated and anonymized construction. Statistical tables, average 
indicators and rates of occurrence create the abstracted reality of a people and the indi-
vidual story is told through the creation of an entirely fictional individual – the average 
person - as “sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory, discipline is exer-
cised on the bodies of individuals and security is exercised over a whole population”.11 
Whereas previously the state mandated the disciplining of the individual such that 
each and every person would comply with government directives under security power, 
the state detaches itself from the micro-terrain and concerns itself with the macro-features 
of society. Instead of focus being on absolute compliance, the focus is on generating 
norms, acceptable ranges and optimal averages. Perfection is abandoned in favour of op-
timization as “one works in probabilities” because security power is “a matter of maxim-
izing the positive elements and minimizing the risky or inconvenient while knowing that 
they will never be completely suppressed”.12 Foucault describes “statistics and ‘normality’ 
(being) linked together and to security”13 as while “discipline allows nothing to escape… 
(the) smallest things must not be abandoned to themselves”,14 the overarching question 
of security is “how to keep a type of (behaviour) within socially and economically accepta-
ble limits and around an average that will be considered as optimal for a given social 
functioning”.15 Thus the exercise of security power is a never ending process and one in 
                                                        
8 Discipline and Punish, 81. 
9 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 47. 
10Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-76 [1992] (1997), 242. 
11 Security, Territory, Population, 11. 
12 Ibid., 19. 
13 Ibid., 62. 
14 Ibid., 45. 
15 Ibid., 4. 
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which the concept of flow and circular motion respecting certain rhythms of society op-
erates. While disciplinary power seeks rigid control and works on assumptions of perfect-
ibility and a utopian finality, security power stands on the shoulders of disciplinary power 
to see the greater whole and direct larger outcomes with no definitive end. Exercising 
power at the macro-social level acknowledges the potential insignificance of the individ-
ual as an individual, and while policy ultimately works through the particular, it is the 
movement of the general that is most relevant.  
Foucault articulates the example of the thief in chapter one of Security, Territory, Popu-
lation to concretize the meaning of the shifts from sovereign to discipline and on to secu-
rity forms of power. In this example, the government edict ‘thou shalt not steal’ is accom-
panied by certain punishments if one breaks the law. Under sovereign power, a thief may 
be publicly executed in the “spectacular, definitive moment of the hanging” such that the 
individual who transgressed and hence challenged the authority of the state is dealt with 
and the power of the state over life/death is reinforced for all observers to see and bear 
witness. Under disciplinary power, while the state retains the authority to kill, control 
over the moment of death is not the object. Rather, a new institution is created in the form 
of the justice system where the police, prison and parole administrations in combination 
with social workers and psychologists form a nexus of governance. Detailed records are 
kept of a multitude of individuals who are deemed at high risk of offense, surveillance 
systems are established to monitor high crime areas to deter and capture perpetrators and 
once an individual violator is caught up in the system, a rigidly thorough constellation of 
techniques are applied. To discipline the body of the thief, control is exercised over time 
and space in the prison system while continuous efforts are made to rehabilitate and re-
form the soul of the individual such that he/she will be saved from a life of crime and 
successfully reintegrated into respectable society to become a productive, tax paying citi-
zen.16 The focus is on the criminal as the object is the individual. 
Security power is the “third modulation” which is largely based on the same matrix of 
law, punishment, surveillance and correction as disciplinary power; however, the focus 
fundamentally shifts as the individual is no longer the object of concern and the perfecti-
bility of the individual and society no longer the objective. Instead the apparatus of gov-
ernance is ruled by a new set of questions and desires:  
what is the average rate of criminality for this type? How can we predict statistically the 
number of thefts at a given moment in a given society…are there times, regions, and 
penal systems that will increase or reduce this average rate?...how much does criminal-
ity cost society…what is the cost of repressing these thefts? Does severe and strict re-
pression cost more than one that is more permissive…what is the comparative cost of 
theft and of its repression and what is more worthwhile: to tolerate a bit more theft or 
to tolerate a bit more repression?17  
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Ultimately the very purpose of the entire system shifts. Instead of trying to prevent and 
punish crime and to discipline individuals into becoming good, productive and loyal cit-
izens, the focus of government revolves around the question of keeping a type of crimi-
nality, theft for instance, within socially acceptable limits such that governance of the act 
of theft will be cost-effective for the population as a whole. The state gives up on the goal 
of completely suppressing theft and works in probabilities at the level of the collective. 
The individual transgressor is unimportant as theft is acknowledged as a type of social 
regularity which need not be stamped out but adjusted to ensure optimal social function-
ing.   
This shift in the object of governance has profound consequences as the entire locus of 
government control moves under security power. This is not to say that sovereign or dis-
ciplinary power disappear, rather they are incorporated into yet decentered from the 
overall mechanisms of power operating within the state. All three modes exist simultane-
ously as it is their relative dominance in the system that changes.18 Security power allows 
for a whole new range of discourses to operate and truths to be enacted on the population, 
as the population itself is a rather blank slate upon which truths can operate with greater 
ease than on the individual. As well, resistance, while still possible, becomes more convo-
luted as those in power only seek legibility at the level of the aggregate and the abstrac-
tions they create have no voice. While under sovereign and disciplinary power individu-
als may resist and their voices may be heard by those seeking to act on them as objects 
(even though their cries may fall on deaf ears), under security power the voice of the in-
dividual may not even be registered as the fundamental irrelevance of any particular in-
dividual and the total obsession with the macro by the state renders protest, opposition 
and resistance potentially more challenging. This may be so to the degree that the state 
may not comprehend whether policy is a success or failure as the object they seek to gov-
ern has neither voice nor agency but the voice they ascribe to it. This will become evident 
when examining the case of population control as the quest to make the population legible 
to policymakers often makes the individual illegible as a corollary. 
The Means to Govern the Object 
Security power differs fundamentally in the means by which it seeks to shape the norms 
of society. Sovereign power neglects, or rather ignores, the majority of behaviours which 
occur under its rule, largely restricting itself to the power to let live or cause death, and 
disciplinary power attempts to make legible the individual lives of those under its charge 
by recording and surveying the details of their existence to better perfect their operation. 
In contrast, security power seeks to optimize the population by “having a hold on things 
that seem far removed from population but which, through calculation, analysis and re-
flection, one knows one can really have an effect on it”.19 The locus shifts from knowledge 
of the individual itself to knowledge of the environmental factors affecting the population. 
                                                        
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Ibid., 72. 
Foucault, Security and Population 
Foucault Studies, No. 25, 228-250.     234 
It is the view of “man as human species”20 that defines security power as the population 
and the factors influencing its behaviour are seen more as a set of variables to be manip-
ulated at the macro scale than as discrete objects to be disciplined at the micro scale. Most 
often, agency itself is largely absent in the state’s perception of individuals. With the real-
ization that individuals cannot be accurately predicted but movements at the level of the 
population can be, governments have taken to viewing the population as a somewhat 
inert object which will be responsive to changes generated from the top down so as to 
engineer optimal outcomes at the aggregate.21  
Under disciplinary power the state maintains and targets activities directly at individ-
uals, while under security power there opens up a whole new set of tools whose utility 
lies in their indirect application. The direct consequences of their application are not the 
prime motivator but rather the indirect results of their application become a dominant 
consideration. For example, in 1966 the state of Romania banned abortion. This was not 
due to a conservative or theologically inspired directive relating to the sanctity of life nor 
was it grounded in any type of moral opposition to abortion in general. Rather, the act of 
the ban on abortion was intended to increase the fertility rate of the population as a 
whole.22 By outlawing the most common contraceptive practice of the population, the 
government intended to deny women the tools of family planning so as to lead to an in-
crease in births (those who had fulfilled their demographic duty and had four children 
were allowed access to abortion).23 This increase in births was intended to increase the 
average number of births a woman would have over her lifetime, leading to increased 
rates of population growth which, in turn, were understood to contribute to national 
power. Thus, targeting abortion was intended to lead indirectly to increased national 
power, which was the true focus of policy.24 Many more examples of this type of behav-
iour will be discussed in the case studies below. 
This type of utilization of power is radically different from that under sovereign or 
disciplinary power. Under both of these older forms of power, the law is crafted with 
direct intent and the consequences of its enforcement are understood to be the direct re-
sults which spring forth as individuals comply or resist directives. For example, an anti-
abortion stance may be taken by a government as a moral imperative. Utilizing sovereign 
power the state may simply choose to publicly execute those convicted of having per-
formed abortions as disregard for the law may be seen as representing a challenge to the 
authority of the government. Alternatively, using disciplinary mechanisms, police pow-
ers may be used to shut down abortion clinics, the penal system may apply ‘corrective’ 
                                                        
20 Ibid., 75. 
21 Ibid., 74. 
22 Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity (1998), 1. 
23 Gail Kligman, “The Politics of Reproduction in Ceausescu's Romania: A Case Study in Political Cul-
ture” East European Politics and Societies  6: 364 (1992): 377. 
24 Thomas Keil and Viviana Andreescu. 1999. “Fertility Policy in Ceausescu’s Romania”, Journal of Fam-
ily History 24:4: (1999): 482. 
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measures to reform medical personnel accused of performing illegal operations and pub-
lic education campaigns ‘educate’ individuals concerning their moral duties towards the 
unborn. All of this may be intended to stop an act deemed anti-social with the indirect 
consequences of such a policy being unintended, such as the rise of single mothers, an 
increase in illegal abortions or perhaps merely the increase in use of other forms of family 
planning such as condoms or abstinence. This discussion is not meant to take a position 
on the abortion issue but merely to highlight the alternate intent policies may have, be-
cause while the act of banning abortion may be the same, it is the intent of policy which 
is fundamentally different. Under disciplinary power the goal is to change individual be-
haviour writ large and the means used are direct, while under security power the objec-
tive is to alter the rate of occurrence in a population by targeting a factor which is not 
directly related to the objective but which through analysis one predicts that the scale of 
the population has a high probability of success in achieving the desired outcome. 
The exercise of power in this manner has the potential to provide for more subtle ma-
nipulations of the social body but may also make appeals for reform from the citizenry 
more challenging. The indirect approach to social engineering makes the site of contesta-
tion more elusive as the protesting body may be forced to gather support not only for the 
reform of the direct mechanism but also garner backing to address the indirect aim of the 
state. For example, in Nigeria in the late 1980s the government undertook efforts to pro-
mote contraception and family planning. This was done not out of any great concern on 
behalf of the state for the cause of family planning per se but was implemented as a tool 
to indirectly affect the rate of economic growth. The orthodoxy of the era stipulated that 
high fertility was leading to a poverty trap and only through reducing fertility could the 
government kick-start economic growth. Thus the distribution of contraception and fam-
ily planning knowledge was designed as a tool of economic policy.25  
In northern Nigeria there was a significant backlash against government programs of 
this nature, often from Islamic communities who opposed government attempts to restrict 
fertility on religious and cultural grounds. However, efforts by local communities to build 
resistance to these policies became increasingly difficult as simply addressing issues of 
control over female reproduction, while being the direct policy, was not sufficient to sway 
the regime. The major aim of government intent was the indirect effect that family plan-
ning programs were believed to have on economic growth, and Islamic representatives 
found their efforts frustrated as the demands of the economy overrode their wishes for 
autonomy in matters of reproduction.26 In effect, those seeking to resist and reform family 
planning programs would first need to overcome those who have a direct stake in the 
policy as well as those who have an indirect interest in the program.  
In seeking to grow the economy, the Nigerian government used indirect means in 
pushing family planning programs on northern, rural Nigerians. The government was 
                                                        
25 Elisha Renne, “Perceptions of Population Policy, Development and Family Planning Programs in 
Northern Nigeria” Studies in Family Planning. 27:3 (1996): 132. 
26 Renee, “Perceptions of Population Policy, Development and Family Planning Programs in Northern 
Nigeria”. 
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not concerned that every single Nigerian woman used contraception but was rather pre-
occupied with the rate of contraceptive use and the change in the fertility rate. The behav-
iour of the average Nigerian woman became paramount as through this manipulation of 
social norms relating to child bearing, the state sought to indirectly grow the economy 
and strengthen the powers of the regime. Any contestation of this agenda would likely 
have to contend with multiple sites of power and legitimizing discourses as resistance 
based on cultural opposition to family planning may address merely one aspect of the 
program, which in this case is not even the most significant or crucial front. A second front 
may need to be opened to challenge the narrative which stipulates that lower fertility 
leads to economic growth or perhaps to resist the very notion that principles of economic 
growth outweigh cultural values relating to fertility. Due to this kind of indirect attempt 
to manipulate society to achieve state aims, it is likely more difficult to challenge, resist 
and potentially force reform of state actions. Thus, under security power, the language of 
power shifts from the perfection of the individual to the optimization of an average indi-
cator, the means shift from direct to indirect and as a result the path to resistance became 
more convoluted and challenging. 
A New Direction for the Tools of the Trade 
The conceptual devices which security power relies on, such as statistical constructs, ag-
gregations, averages and rates of occurrence, are deeply enmeshed with the systems of 
power-knowledge, more so than in discipline or sovereign power. The tools and tech-
niques of scientific knowledge generation are tightly intertwined in the mechanism of se-
curity power as the state becomes interdependent with a wide range of actors tasked with 
the gathering, analysis, elaboration and synthesis of information on a macro-scale.27 Stat-
isticians, sociologists, demographers, economists and a host of academic and intellectual 
communities must work with and alongside an extensive state bureaucracy to both 
‘know’ and make ‘legible’ the population to those in power.28 The state becomes involved 
in sponsoring the active construction of the object of the population through the collection 
of data in the form of the census, for example. The census requires an enormous effort by 
the state administrative and bureaucratic organizations to organize a workforce capable 
of gathering data in addition to a professional class which, once trained in the arts of ag-
gregation, must distill the raw data of individual human lives into the information 
deemed necessary to make legible the macro behaviours of the people. For example, in 
the recent Chinese census in 2010, the Chinese government hired an additional six million 
employees over and above the regularly employed staff of the census and statistical bu-
reau. This represents an organization over three times larger than the Chinese army.29 The 
sheer administrative power of the state harnessed for knowledge gathering is crucial for 
the optimal operation of security power. 
                                                        
27 Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”, 246. 
28 James Scott, Seeing Like A State (1999). 
29 Mark MacKinnon, China Undertakes First national Census in 10 Years. The Globe and Mail (2010, 31 
Oct). 
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In addition, a wide variety of non-state actors are active players in the construction of 
the population as an object of governance as well as in the discursive legitimation of state 
authority through the construction of narratives validating the operation of security 
power. For example, in the case of population control in the developing world, countless 
demographers, economists, military planners, political scientists, biologists, doctors and 
other members of the academic and intellectual community were critical in legitimizing 
the state’s role in manipulating the procreative powers of the citizenry. A new discourse 
on the meaning of population growth was created and propagated by the centers of 
knowledge in both the developing and developed world such that a new duty was 
adopted by the state - to reduce fertility so as to bring about the modernization and de-
velopment of the country.30 Those entrusted by the population to create knowledge cre-
ated the narrative of a relationship between fertility and economic growth which became 
so dominant as to achieve the status of a ‘truth’. Population control was deemed vital to 
development efforts, thus states were not only supported in their efforts to exert a new 
level of control over the population but those states failing to employ these powers were 
criticized and labelled as backwards.31  
Population control’s basic truth lay in the realm of security power as the individual 
was not of concern but rather the fertility rate of the population as a whole became the 
site of governance. The disciplinary powers of the state were a means to achieve an end 
that lay beyond the perfection of the individual because the average person, not the indi-
vidual per se, was the object of concern. Deviations from the optimal individual behaviour 
could be tolerated conceptually (if not always in practice) as compliance with idealized 
fertility practice only mattered in as much as a new norm was created, new aggregates 
achieved and rates of occurrence stayed within acceptable limits, as understood by the 
intellectual community which informed the state. New states were socialized into this 
new language of state-ness as fluency in the language of security power became necessary 
to be considered modern. As will be shown in the cases below, the very essence of popu-
lation control lay in the conceptual realm of security power as without security power, 
efforts at lowering fertility bore little direct meaning. 
The state had no need for these types of knowledge gathering activities or personnel 
under sovereign power, and while disciplinary power often utilizes the extensive systems 
of power-knowledge built up in the twentieth century, security power is utterly depend-
ent on a deep and extensive system of knowledge gathering, analysis and administration. 
Its very premise is predicated on an apparatus of power-knowledge and the harnessing 
of massive amounts of data combined with sophisticated instruments of analysis, such as 
statistical tools, to make real the very constructs the state wishes to manipulate. One can 
see this very distinctively in the case of population control as over the course of the 1960s 
and 1970s the post-colonial developing world underwent a process whereby the UN, 
                                                        
30 Hodgson, “Demography: Twentieth Century History”, Szreter, “The Idea of Demographic Transition 
and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History”. 
31 Deborah Barret and Amy Ong Tsui. “Policy as Symbolic Statement: International Response to Na-
tional Natalist Policies” Social Forces  78:1 (1999): 213-234. 
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World Bank and western development agencies funded and trained a complimentary net-
work of institutional structures designed to facilitate the rise of a knowledge generating 
class within the developing world to allow for the mechanisms of power-knowledge to 
work autonomously in a wide variety of settings. For example, the UN Secretariat was 
active in establishing the first censuses of many African states with the Population and 
Statistical Commission being critical to enabling an institutional capacity to record demo-
graphic and vital statistics.32 The apparatus of knowledge generation through state bu-
reaucratic and administrative power is essential to the mission of population control as 
without the detailed data gathered by the state, the population remained a concept ill-
suited to manipulation. The very abstraction of the population lost any foundation in re-
ality and the state lay crippled in the application of its powers as it lacked the means by 
which to populate its abstractions. Thus many African states had to be educated/social-
ized by the international community in the steps necessary to make the practice of security 
power possible in the context of population control.33 
It is important to note that security power is not merely the act of aggregation or ‘mas-
sifying’ the individual into a collective as it is not the sum of individuals which ultimately 
matters. Also, security does not seek to gain the totality of information on the totality of 
individuals to better know and govern every individual. The individual or individuals 
are not truly the object of concern and instead an entirely new abstraction is effectively 
created as ‘the population’, an almost separate reified entity, works under its own logic 
and is understood to operate under its own principles. In tandem, security power is about 
governing motion and a ‘natural’ flow of behaviours. While traditional forms of power 
effectively govern snapshots in time, looking at the number of crimes committed, children 
educated or babies born, Foucauldian security governs an active, reified entity. The crime 
rate, literacy rate and fertility rate are the sites of governance which belong to the object 
of the population. At any given moment one can ascertain what is occurring in real time 
through a knowledge of the characteristics of the population. Thus one governs the pop-
ulation in real time through the manipulation of rates and averages as it is the movement 
of these statistical constructs that inform government. Accordingly, the nature of govern-
ance fundamentally changes under security power as its basic comprehension of what is 
being governed (the population), the means to governing (indirect) and the metrics of 
governance (rates, averages) are different from previous eras. This is important not just to 
understand the nature of modern governance but to inform the means and possibilities of 
resistance to the state. Resistance becomes increasingly complex as those challenging ex-
isting structures must contend with a power that, in extremis, does not acknowledge the 
individual and whose modus operandi makes locating the actual site and intent of action 
difficult. 
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CASE STUDIES 
France 
While the history of French efforts to control population growth extends beyond the 20th 
century, the inter-war period marks a relatively unique time where attempts to grow the 
population through the manipulation of fertility were at their relative height. One can see 
the mechanisms of security power most clearly here as it saturates the discourse and prac-
tice of pro-natalism. To understand the context of French pro-natalist activity, one must 
understand the pre-existing discourses of power being propagated by the academic and 
intellectual communities of Europe at the time. In this era, there was a firm ‘truth’ in op-
eration which stated that a key metric of national power was the size of one’s population; 
not in an absolute sense but rather the rate of population growth signified the enlarged 
potential for military manpower, increased economic strength, enhanced cultural prestige 
and an overall virility and vitality of the population.  
This economy of truth on the matter of population was intimately bound up in the 
power-knowledge apparatus as this did not represent a mere concoction of fringe propa-
ganda but was endorsed by the leading politicians, academics, businessmen and cultural 
leaders of the time. For example, one of the most influential non-government organiza-
tions in French society at the time was the ‘Alliance Nationale Pour L’acrroissement de la 
Population Francaise’. Membership of the organization ranged from Emile Zola, a leading 
cultural figure, to Edouard Michelin, head of the wealthy industrialist family, as it spon-
sored and produced a wide range of materials designed to influence the French public of 
its “patriotic duty of procreation” and lobbied parliament to produce pro-natalist legisla-
tion.34 The promotion of the pro-natalist discourse by organizations such as the Alliance 
Nationale was extremely successful; in 1911 the pro-natalist block in parliament boasted 
about 1 in 5 deputies, whereas by 1924 approximately 3 out of every 5 deputies openly 
allied themselves with the pro-natalist movement.35 
The drive to higher fertility was fueled by a drive for state power. Neither the govern-
ment nor civil society organizations such as the Alliance Nationale cared about fertility 
per se nor did they seek to control fertility as part of a religious or moral crusade. While 
traditionalist language is occasionally referenced in relation to the role of women as moth-
ers, the movement is not primarily part of a patriarchal backlash against progressive ide-
als. Rather, the quest to control fertility is firmly grounded as an indirect method of in-
creasing state power, especially military power. Mechanisms of security power saturated 
thinking on national defense as it was through analysis and reflection that the government 
determined that by acting indirectly on the object of the population, it could amplify its 
true goal, which was the empowerment of the state to militarily confront other aggressive 
foreign nations. 
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The logic of pro-natalism was explained by French Premier George Clemenceau, who 
argued during a debate on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles that  
the treaty does not say that France must undertake to have children, but it is the first 
thing which ought to have been put in. For if France turns her back on large families, 
one can put all the clauses one wants in a treaty, one can take all the guns out of Ger-
many, one can do whatever one likes. France will be lost because there will be no more 
Frenchmen.36  
Similarly, Paul Reynaud, future Minister of Justice and Commerce, declared during a de-
bate on defense in the Chamber of Deputies that “there is one factor that dominates all: 
the demographic factor”.37 To further entrench the point, Fernand Laurent, a deputy of 
the Chamber, exclaimed “denatalite (depopulation) isn’t a health problem, it is a problem 
of national defense of the first order, perhaps the most important of all. Tomorrow it will 
be the problem of national defense itself”.38 Thus the issue of fertility and population 
growth came to be synonymous with national defense. Instead of arming the people, in-
vesting in weapons research, enlarging the size of the military or other factors directly 
related to bolstering the armed power of the state, the government sought to act indirectly 
and attempted to increase the rate of population growth of the nation through birth. 
This indirect approach to increasing the capacities of the state to defeat rival empires 
was itself approached indirectly, as per the logic of security power. The state did not de-
cree that every citizen must produce X number of offspring or attempt to regulate the 
sexual lives of the people such that a sufficient amount of procreative acts occurred to 
guarantee increased production of babies. Rather, the government sought to manipulate 
factors removed from the actual act of reproduction and work on issues which it believed 
would shape the environment for decision making such that at the level of the aggregate 
the fertility rate of the population as a whole would increase. Individual compliance with 
these manipulations was of secondary importance as the primary concern lay in shaping 
rates of occurrence as told through statistics. 
For example, in 1920 the Chamber of Deputies passed a law which made contraceptive 
propaganda and any inducement to abortion illegal and punishable with up to six months 
in prison. Simply disseminating information on methods of birth control made one liable 
to criminal prosecution.39 In addition, the tax code was altered to add a surcharge of 
twenty five percent on the income tax payments of those who were twenty years old or 
more and who were unmarried. As well, childless couples who had been married for at 
least ten years saw an increase of ten percent on their income taxes. Legislation in 1921 
gave subsidized access to public transit for large families, and in 1922 large families re-
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ceived legally sanctioned preferential treatment in rental accommodations in public hous-
ing estates.40 These measures were introduced under the mantle of the Conseil Superieur 
de la Natalite, which was created by the government and spearheaded by the finance 
minister, whose mission was to adopt all possible measures to “deter population decline, 
increase the birthrate, develop child care resources and to protect and honour the institu-
tion of large families”.41 
The widespread failure of birthrates to climb in this period was at least partly due to 
the fact that the operations of security power did not allow, conceptually speaking, for an 
appreciation of the micro foundations upon which the decision to bear children rested. 
All state resources went into a macro conceptualization of the population as legions of 
bureaucrats, administrators, academics and intellectuals laboured to create tools to best 
aggregate individuals into the abstracted totality of ‘the population’. Once sufficiently ab-
stracted, the state could perceive trends and rates of occurrence with ease but this inci-
dentally stripped the operation of agency from individuals. The population became an 
object which was understood to be responsive to top-down engineering as the optimiza-
tion of the population drove state efforts. For example, in addition to the policies de-
scribed above, Mother’s Day was created as a national holiday42 and military styled med-
als were given to mothers who produced a certain number of children to create the proper 
psychological climate for childbearing.43 Penalties for abortion were strengthened such 
that abortionists received up to ten years in prison and women convicted of having abor-
tions could suffer two year terms of incarceration. Abortion prosecutions intensified; 
while in 1935 convictions numbered a mere 277, by 1940 there were 1225 criminal abortion 
convictions, representing a 450% increase.44  
Through general disincentives to prevent pregnancy and widespread incentives, both 
financial and honourary, to child bearing, the state sought to act on the reified population. 
The population was understood to rationally respond to the mechanisms of incentive and 
disincentive; however, little study was done on whether these indirect manipulations 
would actually lead to higher birthrates or which groups of people were more susceptible 
to indirect encouragement. Individual wishes and micro-level rationality were deemed 
functionally irrelevant to policymakers, as can be seen by the fact that, for example, cou-
ples were not consulted on whether higher income tax payments would cajole them into 
producing more offspring. The population, as an abstraction, was understood to respond 
to rational mechanisms of direction, and individuals, as they actually behaved, were not 
the object of consideration. 
Resistance to state pro-natalist campaigns proved difficult as not only was the state not 
consulting or interested in the opinions, wishes or motivations of the people in regard to 
their fertility but it actively sought to suppress countervailing discourses on the meaning 
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of fertility. Malthusians, feminists and other actors who sought to increase the reproduc-
tive control of women and reduce the rate of child bearing were deemed traitorous as acts 
retarding the increase in population growth were understood to be attacks on national 
defense. The Ministries of War, Interior and Justice became involved in persecuting and 
prosecuting members of the anti-natalist movement, just as, for example, abortionists 
were labeled “murderers of the fatherland” and abortion was labelled a crime against the 
“embryo, the society, the state and the race”.45 While an individual can speak out against 
state attempts to force higher fertility upon her, the population has no voice. National 
leaders can ascribe any truth to it, and with a near exclusive focus on the abstraction of 
the population, the state never need hear or be subject to any opposing views. Despite 
protestations by many individuals, the population was believed to be responsive to gov-
ernment control. Moreover, resistance to the state’s population policies effectively became 
an act of treason as the discourse of national defense became intertwined with that of 
population growth. Strengthening the forces of national defense through indirectly at-
tempting to shape the average fertility rate of the population rendered any opposition to 
pro-natalism extremely precarious as it not only had to contend with the varied interests 
associated with the pro natalist campaigns (and their beneficiaries) but also wrestle with 
the proponents of a stronger state. 
It is relevant to note that at no recorded instance was any definitive numerical target 
set for achievement in relation to population growth. The state did not desire to increase 
the population by 10 million citizens or to satiate her desire for growth at 50 million in-
habitants. Instead, general exhortations to increase the rate of population growth through 
manipulating the fertility rate were the norm. The optimization of the flow and rhythms 
of reproduction were the target as increasing the average number of children produced 
per woman became a national obsession. No state of perfection was to be achieved as 
there was no finality to any kind of behaviour or activity. Disciplinary mechanisms were 
used as a tool of security power as the rigours of the penal system, as well as the normal-
izing efforts of the state bureaucracy, were employed not to target the individual and 
shape it to a perfected state of docile obedience but instead to shape the social norms and 
achieve an idealized rate of occurrence. 
India 
Similar to the case of inter-war France, management of the reproductive powers of the 
population became an obsession in modern India. The power of the state was understood 
to lie in the wombs of the people, as narrated by the underlying discourse. Whereas France 
attempted to increase the fertility of its population as part of an effort to strengthen the 
state, India would seek to decrease the fertility rate of its people. In the post-colonial en-
vironment, a high rate of fertility was deemed a sign of backwardness and an active hin-
drance to development. Lowering birthrates was declared essential to any program of 
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modernization as economic growth was believed to depend on reducing rates of popula-
tion growth. Lower fertility would ease the burden on state resources and provide for a 
pool of savings at the individual and state level to allow for a capital base to grow, which 
would foster industrialization.46 Accordingly, efforts to promote family planning were 
undertaken as an indirect approach to increasing rates of economic growth. 
As early as 1951, the Indian state declared its intent to shape the reproductive behav-
iours of the population to achieve national goals. The first five-year plan declared the need 
for “family limitation and population control” in order “to stabilize the population at a 
level consistent with the requirements of the national economy”.47 This attitude continued 
through the second five-year plan as the second plan explicitly stated “the outcome of 
development efforts can be noticeably different if population trends are altered in the 
right direction. This is one of those fields in which traditional modes of thought and be-
havior are apt to offer considerable resistance to rational approaches”.48 Here the popula-
tion is explicitly identified as the object of governance and individual level understand-
ings of the motivations for childbearing are openly scorned. The state is the ‘rational’ actor 
manipulating the abstracted whole as part of an indirect campaign to boost economic 
growth rates. The individual is not an object of concern or merit and its “traditional” 
thoughts and behaviours are to be corrected and overcome in order to achieve the results 
desired at the level of the aggregate.  
To better entrench the power-knowledge apparatus that underpinned the operation of 
security power in this field, both external and internal resources were marshalled. Nu-
merous foreign experts were brought in in the form of the Ford Foundation, the Popula-
tion Council, USAID, UNFPA and the World Bank to advise and assist the Indian govern-
ment and to evangelize the legitimizing discourse amongst the Indian people.49 One can 
see the discursive power at play as external actors helped facilitate the creation of demo-
graphic institutes in Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi and Thiruvananthapuram whose purpose 
was to develop new knowledges and techniques of population control.50 This was not 
solely an external push as internal factors were just as strong as leading political and in-
tellectual leaders such as Nehru repeatedly urged “family limitation” in order “to pro-
mote the development of the national economy”.51 
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The plan to indirectly increase rates of economic growth through changing the fertility 
rate was also implemented in a relatively indirect manner, consistent with the tenets of 
security power. For example, the government initiated a program to provide contracep-
tives free of charge to those earning less than Rs (Rupees) 100 a month and half price to 
those earning between Rs 100 and 200.52 The number of clinics for the provision of family 
planning services rose from 147 at the end of the first five-year plan to 4165 by the end of 
the second.53 Training was intensified for all health workers and a national publicity cam-
paign was initiated which printed over half a million posters and broadcast hundreds of 
radio programs in multiple languages. On average, each of India’s twenty-six radio sta-
tions had a talk, discussion, dialogue or feature on family planning issues at least once 
every two weeks over the course of the second five-year plan.54 These roundabout meth-
ods of anti-natalist encouragement were largely ineffective in reducing the average num-
ber of children produced. Providing subsidized contraception and public pronounce-
ments of the benefits of reduced fertility did not address the underlying rationales of re-
production. These aggregate level approaches ignored the individual level logic of pro-
creation which, in a rural and agricultural economy such as India’s in the 1950s, rested 
more on the production of farm labour, guarantees of old age security and the cultural 
value attached to fertility which children brought.  
Despite the failure of the first two plans to significantly reduce fertility rates, the state 
remained undeterred. The quest for economic growth was deemed the ultimate impera-
tive, and reducing the rate of population growth was understood to be a crucial part of 
the platform for development. Instead of focusing its resources on raising education lev-
els, investing in factories and increasing agricultural yields, the government poured 
money and manpower into the anti-natalist campaign. By the 1970s Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi affirmed that “there is no doubt that the rate of growth of population must be 
brought down, not in deference to the barrage of propaganda which is directed at us, but 
because of our own conviction that family planning is essential for improving our stand-
ard of living”.55 Gandhi was reinforced by official policy which declared that, “if the fu-
ture of the nation is to be secured… the population problem will have to be treated as a 
top national priority and commitment”.56 
Under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, action at the federal level included the freezing 
of the allocation of seats to parliament at the 1971 level so as not to reward districts which 
witnessed population increases with additional seats. Resource allocation was also based 
on the 1971 census data so further links between increases in population and extra re-
sources would be severed. Additional population growth would result in the impoverish-
ment of the people, thus, the government hoped, an incentive would be created for lower 
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levels of government to pursue population control policies with added zeal.57 Continued 
financial flows to the states became hostage to the family planning agenda as financial 
allocations became subject to performance criteria established by the federal level relating 
to the success in fertility reduction campaigns. Nationwide, the legal marriage age was 
raised to 18 for women and 21 for men and “population values” were introduced into the 
education system. Moreover, Prime Minister Gandhi supported the call for coercion; for 
example, at a conference of the Physicians’ Association, she argued that, “we must now 
act decisively and bring down the birth rate. We should not hesitate to take steps which 
might be described as drastic. Some personal rights have to be held in abeyance for the 
human rights of the nation: the right to live, the right to progress”.58 
 
At the international level, many foreign observers applauded the anti-natalist drives of 
the Indian state. Speaking to concerns regarding the rapid and mass distribution of con-
traceptives such as the intra-uterine device (IUD), J. Robert Wilson, Chair of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology at Temple University, declared that,  
we have to stop functioning like doctors, thinking about the one patient with pelvic in-
flammatory disease; or the one patient who might develop this, that or other complica-
tions from an intra-uterine device…it may well be that the incidence of infection is going 
to be pretty high in the patients who need the device most.  
Wilson went further and explained that,  
now obviously, if we are going to use these devices, they are occasionally going to be 
put in the wrong patient. Again, if we look at this from an over-all, long range view, 
perhaps the individual patient is expendable in the general scheme of things, particu-
larly if the infection she acquires is sterilizing but not lethal.  
Similarly, Alan Guttmacher, Chief of Obstetrics at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York and 
the President of Planned Parenthood, advocated that only nurses and midwives be given 
the task of implanting IUDs in the third world due to concerns about time and cost effi-
ciency. When questioned by other doctors who advocated that only a trained physician 
should insert the IUD after a thorough examination due to the risks of pain, bleeding and 
spontaneous expulsion, Guttmacher objected and stated that obtaining a patient’s medical 
history, “would make a more time consuming job out of intra-uterine contraception…We 
dare not lose sight of our goal – to apply this method to large populations”.59  
The population in its abstracted form reigned as the object of governance, and individ-
uals, when they were considered, were seen as relatively inconsequential. Indeed, some 
went as far as to argue that individual lives were near expendable as the quest was not to 
perfect individual behavior or to produce productive citizens (as is the case in disciplinary 
power) but to shape the population as a reified entity. The collection of totalizing data on 
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individuals, a major plank of disciplinary power, was exchanged for the amassing of 
knowledge of the population as told through statistics. The Prime Minister of India herself 
stated that the individual was subservient to the nation and that the goal of shaping ag-
gregated rates of behavior overrode any individual desires. The right of the nation, an 
abstract entity, to progress was the determining factor and individual desires were sub-
ordinated to the reified whole. Moreover, medical professionals the world over aban-
doned their focus on individual care and shifted to a Foucauldian security perspective as 
the individual became obsolete in relation to the population.  
Governance by and through rates of occurrence and averages became the norm, and 
the indirect manipulation of these statistical constructs dominated as the Indian govern-
ment sought to achieve high rates of economic growth. Organized opposition to popula-
tion control was meagre as the social forces resisting government control of procreation 
had not only to contend with the issue of ‘the state in the bedroom’ but with the underly-
ing discourse on development. Resistance grounded in cultural values, individual free-
dom, female choice or any other issue relating to the reproductive act itself merely ad-
dressed one level of the power nexus. The indirect manipulative forces worked at multiple 
levels as the primary concern was not individual reproduction itself nor even control over 
the fertility rate per se but that of regulating the rate of economic growth. The depth of 
the relationship between security power and power-knowledge made it such that re-
sistance required a similar depth of nexuses which proved exceedingly difficult to attain 
at the local level. While this discourse was challenged in a somewhat successful manner 
by an international coalition of activists at the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and 
Development, which helped transform the global discourse towards a more individual 
and female centric model of choice,60 in the year 2000 the National Commission on Popu-
lation stated as its objective “to bring the TFR (total fertility rate) to replacement levels by 
2010 through vigorous implementation of inter-sectoral operational strategies. The long-
term objective is to achieve a stable population by 2045, at a level consistent with the re-
quirements of sustainable economic growth, social development, and environmental pro-
tection,” an objective permeated with the language and practices of security power.61  
Conclusion 
Security power represents the “third modulation” of power and an evolution from the 
powers of sovereign and discipline. While sovereign power focused on the spectacle of 
violence directed at an individual (as well as the observing crowd) and disciplinary power 
sought to produce docile and capable individuals through a totalizing mechanism of sur-
veillance and control, security power represents a marked rupture from the individualis-
tic focus of previous forms. Security reorients the lens of the state towards the population 
as a whole to the relative neglect of the individual. This is not to say that the state does 
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not seek to operate on individuals but rather that the primary objective is no longer the 
individual. The eye of the state rests on the population as an abstraction, often represented 
in the image of the average individual. An expanded power-knowledge apparatus creates 
a novel nexus of actors who work to aggregate and collectivize knowledge of the popula-
tion as a whole. The individual ceases to operate as the site of concern as the “species” 
effectively takes centre stage.62  
This becomes apparent in the history of population control as analyzed in the cases of 
inter-war France and post-colonial India. The population as a whole became the object of 
governance and the individual itself was deemed rather insignificant by a wide range of 
political actors. Individuals mattered in as much as they were data points contributing to 
the statistical construct of an abstracted entity. Manipulations at the level of the abstract 
focused on averages, rates and norms as the continual process of optimization became the 
stated desire, as opposed to the ideal of a perfect end-state found in disciplinary power. 
Indira Gandhi and George Clemenceau shared a common language relating to the neces-
sity of harnessing the fertility of the nation to achieve national ends. Whether it be mili-
tarily defeating rivals or achieving high rates of economic growth, the individual and its 
reproductive desires were functionally irrelevant as the population was the only true site 
of concern in the pursuit of state objectives.  
 Moreover, state behaviour sought to operate indirectly as manipulating factors re-
moved from the objective itself were understood to achieve better results. While discipli-
nary power decreed direct compliance, security power sought to shape the environment 
for decision making as a cost-effective strategy such that, at aggregate levels, rates of oc-
currence would shift in line with state aims. France sought to increase the fertility rate so 
as to indirectly boost the military and economic potentials of the state for future, imagined 
conflicts with foreign rivals. India desired to decrease the average number of children the 
average woman would have as part of an indirect attempt to increase the rate of economic 
growth to achieve ‘development’. These indirect manipulations of average indicators to 
achieve abstract realities of power and modernity are hallmark features of the discourse 
and practice of security power.  
In these cases, security power worked in tandem with a biopolitical understanding as 
the very essence of life, as seen in the practices and moment of natality, and were where 
government leaders sought to exercise control. The creation of life itself, the nucleus of 
our biological existence, was harnessed to further state objectives. While not every exer-
cise of security power involves a biopolitical component, a growing portion of govern-
ment behaviours do integrate security with biopower as part of a comprehensive attempt 
to maximize the power of the state. Nowhere is this more true than in the modern preoc-
cupation with population politics as the vast majority of states, both developed and de-
veloping, are using the tools of security power to harness the powers inherent in the bio-
operations of individuals to maximize state potential. 
An understanding of the complex nature in which security power operates is critical to 
the possibilities of resistance and acknowledging the potential for policy failure. Situating 
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the object at the level of the population, indirect manipulation and reliance on an elaborate 
network of power-knowledge all serve to frustrate individual attempts to resist govern-
ment action. Barriers are raised at the conceptual and practical levels for successful indi-
vidual action. For example, the individual must contend with deeply entrenched disre-
gard for individual input at the governmental level as the individual is fundamentally 
decentered as an object. Furthermore, multiple sites of entrenched interest must be over-
come as both directly and indirectly affected actors become involved in maintaining gov-
ernment control. In addition, robust discursive frames must be challenged if one is to 
overcome the operation of security power as the operation of power-knowledge is deeply 
intertwined with security. Examples throughout the article highlight these challenges as 
individual resistance in France, India and Nigeria is frustrated by powerful operations of 
governmentality.  
However, the methods which make resistance difficult may themselves sow the seeds 
of ineffective policy. Government leaders often make themselves systematically ignorant 
of the micro-foundations of individual realities and so may overlook the actual mecha-
nisms by which compliance with policy is achieved. For example, in India the government 
routinely ignored, or remained relatively ignorant of, the actual wishes of the citizenry for 
ideal family size. Those who regarded children as a source of wealth and familial security 
are unlikely to limit their fertility in response to a government subsidy for sterilization. 
By targeting ‘the population’ as an aggregated entity rather than micro targeting sections 
of the people based on individualized data, the state makes itself more prone to policy 
failure. Consequently, through an understanding of the workings of security power as 
articulated by Foucault, and through the concretization of its operation in the cases of 
India and France, we can broaden our understanding of the ways in which power has 
evolved and provide for improved analysis as to the obstacles which must be overcome 
to contend with this new modulation of power. 
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